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Learning in Games with Strategic
Complementarities Revisited
Ulrich Berger
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Department of
Economics, Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Wien, Austria
Abstract
Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic
complementarities are an important class including many economic applications.
Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games
is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence
has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns (V. Krishna, 1992, HBS
Working Paper 92-073). This result remained unpublished, and it relies on a specific
tie-breaking rule. Here we prove an extension of it by showing that already the
ordinal version of strategic complementarities suffices. The proof does not rely on
tie-breaking rules and provides some intuition for the result. JEL classification: C72,
D83.
Key words: Fictitious Play; Learning Process; Strategic Complementarities;
Ordinal Complementarities.
1 Introduction
In a fictitious play (FP) process two players are engaged in the repeated play
of a finite game. After an arbitrary initial move, in every round each player
takes the empirical distribution of her opponent’s strategies as her belief and
replies with a myopic pure best response. We say that a FP process approaches
equilibrium, if the sequence of beliefs converges to the set of Nash equilibria
of the game. A game is said to have the fictitious play property (FPP), if every
FP process approaches equilibrium.
Fictitious play was introduced by Brown (1949, 1951) as an algorithm to cal-
culate the value of a two-person zero-sum game. Today, FP serves as a classical
example of myopic belief learning (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, or Young,
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2005). While Shapley’s (1964) example showed that there are games without
the FPP, research on FP focused on identifying classes of games with the
FPP. The largest such classes are zero-sum games (Robinson, 1951), weighted
potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b), 2×n games (Berger, 2005),
first-price auction games (Hon-Snir et al., 1998), games with strategic comple-
mentarities and a unique equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991), and games
with strategic complementarities and diminishing returns (Krishna, 1992). 1
In this paper we concentrate on the last of these results. Krishna’s work,
though frequently cited, remained unpublished. His proof is a bit involved
and provides little intuition. Moreover, two open questions remain:
First, Krishna’s result depends critically on a particular tie-breaking rule.
Without imposing a tie-breaking rule, Monderer and Sela (1996) constructed
an example of a 2×2 game with strategic complementarities and diminishing
returns without the FPP. 2 In their example, it is a degeneracy of the game
which permits nonconvergence of FP. They refer to Monderer and Shapley
(1996a), who showed that a nondegeneracy condition is sufficient to save the
FPP for 2×2 games, but they also state that they “do not know whether
such a generic result holds for Krishna’s games as well” (p. 145). Hence the
question if a nondegeneracy condition can save Krishna’s result in the absence
of tie-breaking rules, remained open.
The second question is more than a mere technicality. Milgrom and Shannon
(1994) showed that many of the known results for games with strategic com-
plementarities can already be derived under the weaker condition of ordinal
complementarities. In his paper, Krishna also raises the question if ordinal
complementarities could be sufficient for his result. However, as he explains,
his method of proof does not extend to this larger class of games, and hence
he leaves this question unanswered.
The present paper clarifies these open questions. Without imposing a tie-
breaking rule, we provide an intuitive proof of the following extension of Kr-
ishna’s result: Every nondegenerate game with ordinal complementarities and
diminishing returns has the FPP.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce the notation and terminology we use, and define strategic and ordinal
complementarities, diminishing returns, nondegeneracy, and fictitious play. In
Section 3 we derive the main theorem, and Section 4 concludes.
1 Convergence results are also available for related versions of FP, such as stochastic
FP (Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993, Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002), continuous-time
FP (Brown, 1949, Berger, 2007b), generalized weakened FP (Leslie and Collins,
2006), alternating FP (Berger, 2007a), or the best response dynamics (Matsui, 1992,
Hofbauer, 1995). In this paper we focus exclusively on classical discrete-time FP.
2 For a helpful visualization of this example see Cressman (2003, p. 84).
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2 Notation and Definitions
2.1 Bimatrix Games and Best Responses
Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game where player 1, the row player, has pure strate-
gies i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and player 2, the column player, has pure strategies
j ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. A and B are the n×m payoff matrices for players 1
and 2. Thus, if player 1 chooses i ∈ N and player 2 chooses j ∈M , the payoffs
to players 1 and 2 are aij and bij, respectively. The set of mixed strategies of
player 1 is the n− 1 dimensional probability simplex Sn, and analogously Sm
is the set of mixed strategies of player 2. With a little abuse of notation we will
not distinguish between a pure strategy i of player 1 and the corresponding
mixed strategy representation as the i-th unit vector ei ∈ Sn. Analogously we
identify player 2’s pure strategy j with the j-th unit vector fj ∈ Sm.
The expected payoff for player 1 playing strategy i against player 2’s mixed
strategy y = (y1, . . . , ym)
t ∈ Sm (where the superscript t denotes the transpose
of a vector or matrix) is (Ay)i. Analogously (B
tx)j is the expected payoff for
player 2 playing strategy j against the mixed strategy x = (x1, . . . , xn)
t ∈ Sn.
If both players use mixed strategies x and y, respectively, the expected payoffs
are x · Ay to player 1 and y · Btx to player 2, where the dot denotes the
scalar product of two vectors. We denote by BR2(x) player 2’s pure strategy
best response correspondence, and by br2(x) her mixed strategy best response
correspondence. Analogously, BR1(y) and br1(y) are the sets of player 1’s
pure and mixed best responses, respectively, to y ∈ Sm. Let BR(x,y) =
BR1(y)×BR2(x) and br(x,y) = br1(y)×br2(x). We say that (xˆ, yˆ) is a best
response to (x,y) ∈ Sn×Sm, if (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ br(x,y). Also, we call (xˆ, yˆ) a pure
best response to (x,y), if (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ BR(x,y). A strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if (x∗,y∗) ∈ br(x∗,y∗). It is called a pure Nash
equilibrium, if (x∗,y∗) ∈ BR(x∗,y∗).
2.2 Ordinal and Strategic Complementarities
We begin by defining the ordinal and the cardinal versions of strategic comple-
mentarities, which for simplicity we call ordinal and strategic complementari-
ties, respectively. 3 Following Krishna, we restrict the analysis to completely
ordered strategy spaces. For bimatrix games the “natural” ordering of pure
strategies by their numbers is used.
Definition 1 (i) A bimatrix game (A,B) has ordinal complementarities, if
for all i < i′ and j < j′:
ai′j > aij =⇒ ai′j′ > aij′ and bij′ > bij =⇒ bi′j′ > bi′j.
3 These games have also been called quasi-supermodular and supermodular games,
respectively. Here we want to stick closer to Krishna’s terminology.
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(ii) A bimatrix game (A,B) has strategic complementarities, if for all i < i′
and j < j′:
ai′j′ − aij′ > ai′j − aij and bi′j′ − bi′j > bij′ − bij.
We write GOC short for game with ordinal complementarities, and GSC for
game with strategic complementarities. 4 In a GOC, payoffs satisfy a single
crossing condition: the difference between two payoffs in a column of A or a line
of B can change its sign at most once, and only from −1 to +1, if the players
move up to a higher column or line, respectively. In a broader context, these
games have been studied by Milgrom and Shannon (1994). From Definition
1, ordinal complementarities are implied by strategic complementarities. In
a GSC, the advantage of switching to a higher strategy increases when the
opponent chooses a higher strategy.
2.3 Diminishing Returns
Another condition we use is diminishing returns. This property means that
the payoff advantage of increasing one’s strategy is decreasing.
Definition 2 A bimatrix game (A,B) has diminishing returns (DR), if for
all i = 2, . . . , n− 1 and j ∈M ,
ai+1,j − aij < aij − ai−1,j,
and for all i ∈ N and j = 2, . . . ,m− 1,
bi,j+1 − bij < bij − bi,j−1.
2.4 Nondegenerate Games
As mentioned above, without assuming a tie-breaking rule, one must impose
a nondegeneracy assumption in order to keep the FPP, even in the class of
2×2 games. We work with games which are nondegenerate in the following
specific sense.
Definition 3 We call a bimatrix game (A,B) degenerate, if for some i, i′ ∈
N , with i 6= i′, there exists j ∈ M with ai′j = aij, or if for some j, j′ ∈ M ,
with j 6= j′, there exists i ∈ N with bij′ = bij. Otherwise, the game is said to
be nondegenerate.
We write NDGOC short for nondegenerate game with ordinal complementar-
ities.
4 The term “strategic complementarities” was coined by Bulow et al. (1985). GSCs
have been introduced in a general framework by Topkis (1979), see also Vives (1990)
or Milgrom and Roberts (1990). GSCs and GOCs have many important applications
in economics, see Vives (2005) for a recent overview.
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2.5 Improvement Steps
Monderer and Shapley (1996b) defined improvement paths inN×M . We extend
this definition slightly by defining improvement steps.
Definition 4 For a bimatrix game (A,B), define the following binary relation
on N×M : (i, j)→ (i′, j′) ⇔ (i = i′ and bij′ > bij) or (j = j′ and ai′j > aij).
If (i, j) → (i′, j′), we say that this is an improvement step. We denote by
|i′ − i|+ |j′ − j| the length of the improvement step. An improvement path is
a (finite or infinite) sequence of improvement steps (i1, j1)→ (i2, j2)→ · · · in
N×M . An improvement path (i1, j1)→ · · · → (ik, jk) is called an improvement
cycle, if (ik, jk) = (i1, j1).
2.6 Fictitious Play and Switching
Definition 5 For the n×m bimatrix game (A,B), the sequence (it, jt)t∈N is
a discrete-time fictitious play process, if (i1, j1) ∈ N×M and for all t ∈ N,
(it+1, jt+1) ∈ BR(x(t),y(t)),
where the beliefs x(t) and y(t) are given by
x(t) =
1
t
t∑
s=1
is and y(t) =
1
t
t∑
s=1
js.
5
Note that the beliefs can be updated recursively. The belief of a player in
round t+1 is a convex combination of his belief in round t and his opponent’s
move in round t+ 1:
(x,y)(t+ 1) =
t
t+ 1
(x,y)(t) +
1
t+ 1
(it+1, jt+1). (1)
The Euclidean distance between two consecutive beliefs is called the step size
of the process.
Definition 6 The step size of a FP process at time t is the distance
δ(t) = ‖(x,y)(t+ 1)− (x,y)(t)‖.
From (1), δ(t) = 1
t+1
‖(it+1, jt+1) − (x,y)(t)‖, implying that the step size of
any FP process goes to zero as t→∞.
If a fictitious play process converges, it must be constant from some stage
on, implying convergence to the respective pure Nash equilibrium. Even for
5 Brown’s (1951) original definition has players updating alternatingly instead of
simultaneously, but this version has disappeared from the literature, see Berger
(2007a).
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nonconvergent processes it is well known that if the beliefs converge, then the
limit must be a Nash equilibrium. As noted above, however, there are games
where the beliefs need not converge.
If for some belief the best response set is multivalued, there may be several pos-
sible continuations of a fictitious play process. To handle this nonuniqueness,
particular tie-breaking rules have sometimes been imposed. Krishna assumed
that both players, whenever indifferent between two or more pure strategies,
choose the strategy with the highest number. Here we do not impose any
tie-breaking rules.
Whenever one of the players changes her best repsonse, we say that a switch
has occured in the FP process.
Definition 7 A FP process (it, jt) switches from (i, j) to (i
′, j′) at time T , if
(i′, j′) 6= (i, j), (iT−1, jT−1) = (i, j), and (iT , jT ) = (i′, j′).
If i = i′ or j = j′, we call this a single-switch, and if i 6= i′ and j 6= j′, we call
it a double-switch.
We write 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 to denote the occurence of a switch from (i, j) to (i′, j′)
in the FP process. If the switch occurs at time T , we write 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉T .
If a switch occurs infinitely often, it is called a permanent switch.
In a nonconvergent FP process, eventually only permanent switches occur.
After each switch, some pure best response is repeated for a finite number
of periods. During these repetitions the beliefs are shifted towards the corre-
sponding vertex of the simplex-product. We call the length of this shift the
belief-shift of the switch.
Definition 8 Let 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉T be a permanent switch, and let the subse-
quent switch be 〈(i′, j′), (i′′, j′′)〉T+k, i.e., (iT , jT ) = · · · = (iT+k−1, jT+k−1) =
(i′, j′) is repeated k times between the two switches. We call the Euclidean dis-
tance s(T ) = ‖(x,y)(T +k−1)− (x,y)(T )‖ the belief-shift of 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉T .
Definition 9 Assume that the switch 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 is permanent, and let the
periods of occurence be t1 < t2 < · · ·, i.e. 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉tl for l ≥ 1. We say that
〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 has a persistent belief-shift, if lim supl→∞ s(tl) > 0. Otherwise,
〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 is said to have a vanishing belief-shift. 6
3 Fictitious Play in Nondegenerate Games with Ordinal Comple-
mentarities and Diminishing Returns
Having supplied the necessary definitions, we now collect some preliminary
results, most of which are proved elsewhere.
Krishna (1992) observed that DR restrict the best response correspondence of
6 There is a relation to another property of fictitious play here. If all permanent
switches in an FP process have persistent belief-shifts, the process exhibits infrequent
switching in the terminology of Fudenberg and Levine (1995), and is what Monderer
et al. (1997) called smooth.
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a game in the following way.
Lemma 10 Let (A,B) be a game with DR. Then for any (x,y) ∈ Sn×Sm,
the sets BR1(y) and BR2(x) contain at most two strategies. If one of these
sets contains two strategies, they are numbered consecutively.
If in a FP process the switch 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 occurs infinitely often, then players
become asymptotically indifferent between i and i′ and between j and j′ at the
times of switching. From Lemma 10, a consequence of this is, that in games
with DR, FP can eventually only switch to neighboring strategies.
Lemma 11 Let (A,B) be a game with DR. If 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 occurs infinitely
often, then |i′ − i| ≤ 1 and |j′ − j| ≤ 1.
Proof. W.l.o.g. suppose |i′ − i| ≥ 2, and let the periods where the switch
occurs be tk for k ∈ N. Then i ∈ BR1(y(tk − 1)) and i′ ∈ BR1(y(tk)) for all k.
Since the step size of the process vanishes, y(tk − 1) and y(tk) have the same
set of limit points. If yˆ is such a limit point, then yˆ ∈ Sm by compactness,
and BR1(yˆ) contains i and i
′ by upper-semicontinuity of the best response
correspondence. But this contradicts Lemma 10. 2
The Improvement Principle of Monderer and Sela (1997) roughly states that
a switch implies an improvement step.
Lemma 12 Let (it, jt) be a FP process in a nondegenerate game. If 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉,
then i 6= i′ =⇒ (i, j)→ (i′, j) and j 6= j′ =⇒ (i, j)→ (i, j′).
If the sequence of switches in a FP process consists entirely of single-switches,
then it follows that this sequence generates an improvement path. However,
suppose 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 is a double-switch. Lemma 12 then implies that (i, j)→
(i′, j) and (i, j) → (i, j′), but in general there need not be an improvement
path from (i, j) to (i′, j′), since neither (i′, j) → (i′, j′) nor (i, j′) → (i′, j′)
need be true.
The Second Improvement Principle implies that there are indeed improvement
paths (i, j)→ (i′, j)→ (i′, j′) and (i, j)→ (i, j′)→ (i′, j′), if the double-switch
has a persistent belief-shift.
Lemma 13 Let (it, jt) be a FP process in a nondegenerate game. If 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉
has a persistent belief-shift, then i 6= i′ =⇒ (i, j′) → (i′, j′) and j 6= j′ =⇒
(i′, j)→ (i′, j′).
Proof. Assume i 6= i′. Let the sequence of periods where the switch 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉
occurs be (tk)k∈N. Let Y ∗ be the set of limit points of y(tk). By compactness
of the simplex, Y ∗ ⊂ Sm, and since the belief-shift is persistent, we can find a
point y∗ ∈ Y ∗ and a subsequence of periods, for simplicity denoted by tk again,
such that y(tk) converges to y
∗ and s∗ = limk→∞ s(tk) > 0. Let tk + Tk be the
periods where the subsequent switches occur, and let y∗∗ = limk→∞ y(tk+Tk).
Note that {i, i′} ⊂ BR1(y∗) and i′ ∈ BR1(y∗∗) by upper-semicontinuity of
the best response correspondence. Now since s∗ > 0, y∗∗ is a strict convex
combination of y∗ and fj′ , viz. y∗∗ = cfj′ + (1− c)y∗ for some 0 < c < 1. Left-
multiplying with the matrix A yields Ay∗∗ = cAfj′ + (1− c)Ay∗. Subtracting
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the i-th line of this vector equation from the i′-th line yields
(Ay∗∗)i′ − (Ay∗∗)i = c[ai′j′ − aij′ ] + (1− c)[(Ay∗)i′ − (Ay∗)i]
The second term on the right hand side of this equation vanishes since {i, i′} ⊂
BR1(y
∗), implying ai′j′ − aij′ = c−1[(Ay∗∗)i′ − (Ay∗∗)i]. Since i′ ∈ BR1(y∗∗),
the right hand side is non-negative, so aij′ ≤ ai′j′ . By nondegeneracy, (i, j′)→
(i′, j′). The same argument for player 2 shows that j 6= j′ =⇒ (i′, j) →
(i′, j′). 2
Note that in case of a single-switch, Lemma 13 coincides with Lemma 12.
Lemma 13 is only needed if some double-switch occurs infinitely often along
the FP process. The next result examines the case of a vanishing belief-shift.
Lemma 14 Let (it, jt) be a FP process in a nondegenerate game with DMR.
Suppose 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 is a double-switch with a vanishing belief-shift. Let 〈(i′, j′), (i′′, j′′)〉
be a subsequent switch which occurs infinitely often. Then i′′ ∈ {i, i′} and
j′′ ∈ {j, j′}.
Proof. Let the sequence of periods where the switch 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 occurs
be (tk)k∈N. Consider the subsequence of periods such that the subsequent
switch is 〈(i′, j′), (i′′, j′′)〉, which for simplicity we denote by tk again. Let the
periods where the subsequent switches 〈(i′, j′), (i′′, j′′)〉 occur be tk+Tk. Then
i ∈ BR1(y(tk−1)) and i′ ∈ BR1(y(tk)) and i′′ ∈ BR1(y(tk+Tk)) for all k. Since
the step size of the FP process vanishes, y(tk−1) and y(tk) have the same set
of limit points, and the same is true for y(tk+Tk−1) and y(tk+Tk). Moreover,
since 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 has a vanishing belief-shift, y(tk) and y(tk + Tk − 1) have
vanishing Euclidean distance. Hence the sets of limit points of y(tk−1), y(tk),
and y(tk+Tk) coincide. If yˆ is such a limit point, then yˆ ∈ Sm by compactness,
and BR1(yˆ) contains i, i
′, and i′′ by upper-semicontinuity of the best response
correspondence. By Lemma 10, i′′ = i or i′′ = i′. The analogous argument for
player 2 yields j′′ = j or j′′ = j′. 2
Lemmas 12, 13, and 14 together establish the following:
Lemma 15 Let (it, jt) be a FP process in a nondegenerate game with DMR.
If the beliefs do not converge, then there is an improvement cycle consisting
of improvement steps of length 1.
Proof. Since the beliefs do not converge, there are infinitely many switches.
Since there are only finitely many pure strategy profiles, there exists a time t0
such that from t0 onwards only permanent switches occur. Let 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉
be a permanent switch. If it is a single-switch, then by Lemma 11 and the Im-
provement Principle (Lemma 12), (i, j) → (i′, j′) is a length-1-improvement
step. Suppose now that 〈(i, j), (i′, j′)〉 is a double-switch. The Improvement
Principle implies (i, j) → (i′, j). If the switch has a persistent belief-shift,
then also (i′, j) → (i′, j′) by the Second Improvement Principle (Lemma
13), implying that (i, j) and (i′, j′) are connected by two improvement steps,
which, by Lemma 11, are of length 1. Suppose, on the other hand, that
the double-switch has a vanishing belief-shift. Let 〈(i′, j′), (i′′, j′′)〉 be any of
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the subsequent switches occuring after t0, then this switch is permanent. By
(i′′, j′′) 6= (i′, j′) and by Lemma 14, we have (i′′, j′′) = (i, j) or (i′′, j′′) = (i′, j)
or (i′′, j′′) = (i, j′). In the first case, the two switches lead back to (i, j). In
the second and third case, by Lemma 11 and the Improvement Principle, (i, j)
and (i′′, j′′) are connected by a length-1-improvement step.
By repeatedly applying these arguments, the sequence of switches after time
t0 either jumps back and forth between (i, j) and (i
′, j′) forever, or it generates
an infinite improvement path consisting of length-1 improvement steps. The
first of these two cases reduces to a FP process in the corresponding 2×2
game, which is known to converge in beliefs to a mixed Nash equilibrium. 7
The second case implies the existence of an improvement cycle consisting of
improvement steps of length 1. 2
However, in Berger (2007b, Lemma 18) it was shown that ordinal complemen-
tarities are incompatible with the existence of such improvement cycles:
Lemma 16 In an NDGOC, every improvement path consisting of length-1-
steps is finite.
Our main result is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 15 and 16.
Theorem 17 Every nondegenerate game with ordinal complementarities and
diminishing returns has the fictitious play property.
4 Discussion
We have extended the result of Krishna (1992) to games with ordinal comple-
mentarities and diminishing returns. Working with nondegenerate games, we
could do without invoking a tie-breaking rule.
The intuition is simple: With diminishing marginal returns, a fictitious play
process generates an improvement path consisting of length-1 steps. But or-
dinal complementarities do not allow such an improvement path to cycle, and
hence the fictitious play process eventually either becomes constant or jumps
back and forth between only two pure strategy profiles forever. In both cases
it approaches equilibrium.
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